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1. Introduction
Regulation (EU) No 96/2014, the Market Abuse Regulation (hereinafter
“MAR”),1 and Directive 2014/57/EU (hereinafter “CRIM-MAD”),2, 3 have
replaced the Market Abuse Directive (hereinafter MAD),4 regulating insider
trading5 and market manipulations in the European Union.6 The main reason
why a directive was replaced with a regulation is to grant regulatory unifor-
mity and clarity regarding the key concepts throughout the whole territory of
the Union.7 A uniform regulatory framework was judged to be key to repeal-
ing trade obstacles and distortions of competition, which may arise from dif-
1 Regulation (EU) No 96/2016 of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April
2016 on market abuse (market abuse regulation) and repealing Directive 2003/6/EC of
the European Parliament and of the Council and Commission Directives 2003/124/EC,
2003/125/EC and 2004/72/EC, OJ 12.6.2014 L173/1.
2 Directive 2014/57/EU of the European Parliament and the Council of 16 April 2016 on
criminal sanctions for market abuse (market abuse directive), OJ 12.6.2014 L173/179.
3 Both Regulations entered into force on July 3 2016. For a first introduction to the MAR
seeMarco Ventoruzzo/Sebastian Mock, Market Abuse Regulation, 2017.
4 Directive 2003/6/EC of the European Parliament and the Council of 28 January 2003 on
insider dealing and market manipulation (market abuse), OJ 12.4.2003 L96/16. This Di-
rective had repealed Council Directive of 13 November 1989 coordinating regulations on
insider dealing (89/592/EEC), OJ 18.11.1989 L334/30, on insider trading and introduced
a regulation for market manipulation.
5 We use the term “insider trading” summarizing the offences included in Article 14 MAR.
6 See Carmine Di Noia/Mateja Milic/Paola Spatola, “Issuers’ obligations under the new
Market Abuse Regulation and the proposed ESMA guideline regime: a brief overview”,
Zeitschrift für Bankrecht und Bankwirtschaft 2014, 96.
7 Recitals 3, 4 and 5 MAR.
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ferent national laws, and to developing further the internal capital market.
Although the new regulation has introduced some innovative rules (such as the
extension of the regulatory scope to MTF and OTF8 or the black-out period
for manager transactions),9 it does not change the fundamental logic and struc-
ture of the MAD, which proved a coherent and acceptable (albeit not perfect)
framework for preventing and enforcing insider trading and market manipula-
tion offences.10 For the purposes of this work, it is to be reminded that under
both the MAD and the MAR, insiders must not disclose inside information to
third parties, unless such a disclosure is “in the normal exercise of an employ-
ment, a profession or duties”.11 In that case, an insider must make “complete
and effective public disclosure” of such information, unless the recipient is
bound by a duty of confidentiality based on law, regulations, articles of asso-
ciation or on a contract.12
One of the innovative provisions of the MAR is Article 11 regulating “market
soundings”, which governs the procedure to be followed when a market parti-
cipant seeks to disclose information to selected investors, in order to gauge their
opinion on a possible transaction.13 Themain reason for the introduction of this
provision is that offerors commonly need to capture the opinion of potential
investors on an envisaged operation, particularly on its pricing, and to attain this
goal they are normally requested to disclose pieces of inside information.
It is worth remembering that the European Court of Justice (ECJ) addressed
the question as to whether an offeror, by disclosing to selected parties an en-
visaged operation in order to gauge their opinion, was acting in the “normal
course of exercise of an employment, profession or duties”.14 The Court
decided that a piece of information is deemed to be disclosed in the normal
course of the exercise of employment, profession or duties only when (i) there
is a close link between the disclosure and the exercise of the employment, pro-
fession or duties and (ii) the disclosure is strictly necessary for the exercise of
8 Article 5.1. MAR.
9 Article 19.11. and 19.12. MAR.
10 A comprehensive assessment of the MAD does not fall within the scope of this article.
11 Article 10.1 MAR; this provision was originally entailed in Article 3.1(a) MAD.
12 Article 17.8 MAR; this provision was originally entailed in Article 6.3. MAD.
13 For first comments on market soundings, see SimonW. Tissen, “Die Investorensuche im
Lichte der EU-Marktmissbrauchsverordung”, Neue Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht
2015, 1254; Stefano Lombardo, “I sondaggi di mercato: prime riflessioni”, Le Società
2016, 159; Dirk Zetzsche, Marktintegrität/Marktmissbrauchsrecht, in: Martin Ge-
bauer/Christoph Teichmann (ed.), Enzyklopädie Europarecht – Europäisches Privat-
und Unternehmensrecht, vol. 6, 2016, p. 171 at para 210; Dirk Zetzsche, “Die Markt-
sondierung nach Art. 11 MAR. Pflichten der Sondierenden und der Marktgegenseite”,
Die Aktiengesellschaft 2016, 610.
14 ECJ, 22 November 2005, Grøngaard and Bang, C-384/02, ECLI:EU:C:2005:708.
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that employment, profession or duties. This decision, therefore, did not seem
to leave much free space for market soundings in the normative framework
designed by the MAD.15
Nevertheless, informal contacts between securities’offerors andpotential inves-
tors are deemed necessary for the success of operations that would otherwise
risk not being accepted by the market once officially announced. Despite the
restrictive case law of the ECJ, therefore, market soundings have become com-
mon practice with regard to several types of transactions related to listed shares.
Market soundings, additionally, may also trigger quite complex company law
issues.16 By deciding to communicate an envisaged transaction to only selected
investors, directors of the issuing company might reveal classified and sensitive
information to third parties; additionally, if such information is only disclosed
to selected shareholders, directors would discriminate other shareholders. In
both cases, a decision to disclose an envisaged transaction might be deemed a
violation of directors’ fiduciary duties. This potential conflict between finan-
cial regulation and company law might reveal a much broader contradiction.
On the one hand, due to the globalisation of financial markets, market actors
and regulators are pushed to develop homogeneous practices and rules at the
broadest geographical level;17 on the other hand, companies’ internal affairs are
governed by national states and the EU harmonising effort in this field has not
touched core elements of companies’ internal relations such as director duties
and liabilities.18 Furthermore, it is still controversial whether harmonising di-
rectives have really had a significant impact on national company law regimes
and on domestic legal discourses and taxonomies.19
Thus, rules on market soundings are at the crossroads of securities regulation,
which requires uniformity across national borders, and company law rules,
which are rooted in national political balances and legal discourses. This con-
15 See Chiara Mosca, “Director–Shareholder Dialogues Behind the Scenes: Searching for a
Balance Between Freedom of Expression and Market Fairness”, European Company
and Financial Law Review 2018, 805, 836.
16 See Holger Fleischer/Dorothea Bedkowski, “Aktien- und kapitalmarktrechtliche Pro-
bleme des Pilot Fishing bei Börsengängen und Kapitalerhöhungen”, Der Betrieb 2009,
2195.
17 SeeWolfgang Streeck, Einleitung: Internationale Wirtschaft, nationale Demokratie?, in:
Wolfgang Streeck (ed.), Internationale Wirtschaft, nationale Demokratie, 1998, p. 11.
18 See Carsten Gerner-Beuerle/Edmund Schuster, “The Evolving Structure of Director
Duties in Europe”, European Business Organization Law Review 2014, 191.
19 See: Luca Enriques, “EC Company Law Directives and Regulations: How Trivial are
they?”, University Pa. J. Int’l Econ. Law 2006, 1; Harald Halbhuber, “National Doc-
trinal Structures and European Company Law”, Common Market Law Review 2001,
1385, 1405–1408.
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cealed tension between uniform securities regulation and national company
law regimes also emerges in other areas of EU intervention, such as, for in-
stance, capital requirements and risk management of cross-border financial
groups,20 or financial support within groups of banks,21 which face divergences
across member states as to the role of intra-group relations and groups’ inter-
est.22 Addressing market soundings, therefore, is also a way of addressing the
fragmentation of law and society in the new globalized order, which is revealed
by the struggle between, on the one hand, the globalising tendencies of finan-
cial markets and, on the other hand, local interests addressed by national
rules.23 This article, therefore, also aims at unbundling the interaction between
national company law and EU securities regulation. As an example of this in-
teraction, the United Kingdom and the Italian national regimes will be com-
pared. The U.K. has a longstanding and highly sophisticated practice in finan-
cial market regulation, including market abuses and insider dealings, which
reflects the predominance of widely-held companies, so that its regime was one
of the models for the provisions detailed in theMAR onmarket soundings;24 in
this regard, it is worth stressing that, despite its decision to leave the European
Union, the U.K. is likely to keep its role as a benchmark regime for securities
regulation.25 Italy, by contrast, is a civil law country whose financial market is
far less significant than the British one; additionally, share ownership of Italian
companies is extremely concentrated and families still keep a dominant role in
its economy.26
20 Directive 2013/36/EU of 26 June 2013 on access to the activity of credit institutions and
the prudential supervision of credit institutions and investment firms, OJ 26.6.2013
L176/338; Regulation 575/2013 of 26 June 2013 on prudential requirements for credit
institutions and investment firms, OJ 27.6.2013 L176/1.
21 Directive 2014/59/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 May 2014
establishing a framework for the recovery and resolution of credit institutions and in-
vestment firms, OJ 12.6.2014 L173/190.
22 See: The Informal Company Law Expert Group (ICLEG), Report on the recognition of
the interest of the group, October 2016, p. 15–16.
23 See Andreas Fischer-Lescano/Günther Teubner, “Regime-Collisions: The Vain Search
for Legal Unity in the Fragmentation of Global Law”, Michigan Journal of Interna-
tional Law 2004, 999.
24 The point is made also by Zetzsche, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2016, 610 (fn. 13), 610, who
also adds France as one of the models for the MAR. In particular, see points 1.4.5 and
1.4.6 G of the British Code of Market Conduct containing rules on market soundings.
25 On 23 June 2016, a referendum was held in which the majority of British voters chose to
leave the European Union; as a consequence, the British government triggered the exit
procedure under Article 50 of the TFEU. At the moment, it is unforeseeable what the
final outcome of this procedure and the following negotiations will be.
26 In 2015, the largest shareholders’ voting shares of companies listed at the Milan stock
exchange was 29%: Fabio Bulfone, “Insider job: corporate reforms and power resources
in France, Italy and Spain”, Socio-Economic Review 2016, 16. On the analysis of cor-
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This article is organized as follows. Section 2 provides an overview of market
soundings in the MAR and introduces the situations we intend to study,
namely when securities of a listed company are offered to the market or se-
lected investors, that is to say: (i) secondary offerings (or seasoned offerings),
when a listed company seeks to increase its capital; (ii) accelerated book-
building, when a shareholder aims at selling its shares; (iii) and accelerated
bookbuilding, when a listed company aims at selling own shares held as treas-
ury shares or issuing new shares to selected investors.27 Section 3 analyses
the interaction between company law and market soundings in Italy and the
U.K. Short conclusions are elaborated in Section 4.
2. Market Soundings in Context
2.1. The Context
In order to better understand market soundings, it is useful to briefly address
the main features of the MAR. As for the MAD, its main purpose is to ensure
equal access to inside information with the aim of increasing financial market
efficiency.28 The crucial concept is “inside information”,29 namely information
that (i) is precise, (ii) is not public (iii), has a direct or indirect relation with one
or more issuers or financial instruments and (iv), if made public, would have a
porate governance mechanisms as embedded in national-specific settings of dominant
interests see Ruth V. Aguilera/Gregory Jackson, “The Cross-national Diversity of Cor-
porate Governance: Dimensions and Determinants”, Academy of Management Review
2003, 447.
27 In this regard, we do not address market soundings in initial public offerings (IPOs) (on
which see Stefano Lombardo/Federico M. Mucciarelli, Market soundings: the interac-
tion between securities regulation and company law in the United Kingdom and Italy,
ECGI Law Working Paper, 2017 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstrac
t_id=3012183, last visited: 5 February 2019) and in mergers and takeover bids (governed
by Article 11.2 MAR).
28 Recitals 1 and 24 MAR. Equal access has been recognized as a primary objective of in-
sider trading regulation by the ECJ, 23 December 2009, Spector Photo Group NV, Chris
Van Raemdonck v Commissie voor het Bank-, Financie- en Assurantiewezen (CBFA),
C-45/08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:806; see on the point e.g. Lars Klöhn, “Ad-hoc-Publizität
und Insiderverbot im neuen Marktmissbrauchsrecht”, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2016,
423, 424;Marco Ventoruzzo, Comparing Insider Trading in the United States and in the
European Union: History and Recent Developments, ECGI LawWorking Paper, 2014,
p. 17 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2442049, last visited:
5 February 2019).
29 Article 7.1(a) MAR.
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significant effect on prices of financial instruments.30 The MAR codifies also
previous decisions of the ECJ,31 by qualifying inside information any inter-
mediate steps of a decisional process, provided that they also fit into the four
elements of the general definition.32
While MAR is one of the EU measures aimed at unifying national rules that
“have as their object the establishment and functioning of the internal mar-
ket”33, CRIM-MAD is a directive aimed at ensuring “the effective implementa-
tion of a Union policy in an area which has been subject to harmonisation
measures”34 that only focuses on criminal sanctions for market abuse.35 These
measures are complemented by subordinate legislations,36 such as Regulatory
Technical Standards (RTS)37, Implementing Technical Standards (ITS)38, pro-
posed by ESMA39 and enacted by the Commission, and ESMA guidelines and
recommendations.40
30 In particular, a piece of information is “precise” when it (i) indicates a set of circum-
stances which exists or which may reasonably be expected to come into existence or an
event which has occurred or which may reasonably be expected to occur and (ii) is spe-
cific enough to enable a conclusion as to the possible effect of those circumstances/
events on the prices of financial instruments, Article 7.2. MAR.
31 ECJ, 28 June 2012,Marcus Geltl v Daimler AG, C-19/11, ECLI:EU:C:2012:397.
32 Article 7.3. MAR.
33 Article 114 TFEU.
34 Article 83.2. TFEU.
35 Today’s European legislation seeks to increase regulatory uniformity with regard to se-
curities regulation by replacing directives with regulations. See, for instance, Recital 5 of
the Prospectus Regulation (Regulation (EU) 2017/1129 of the European Parliament and
the Council of 14 June 2017 on the prospectus to be published when securities are of-
fered to the public or admitted to trading on a regulated market, and replacing Directive
20037/71/EC, OJ 30.6.2017 L 168/12).
36 According to the procedure of the “Lamfalussy process”, on which, see Niamh Molo-
ney, “The Lamfalussy Legislative Model: a New Era for the EC Securities and Invest-
ment Services Regime”, International and Comparative Law Quarterly 2003, 509; see
also Niamh Moloney, EU Securities and Financial Markets Regulation, 2014, p. 26.
37 Delegated acts according to Article 290 TFEU.
38 Implementing acts according to Article 291 TFEU.
39 According to, respectively, Article 10 and Article 15 of Regulation (EU)No 095/2010 of
the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 November 2010 establishing a Eur-
opean Supervisory Authority (European Securities and Markets Authority), amending
Decision No 716/2009/EC and repealing Commission Decision 2009/77/EC, OJ
15.12.2010 L331/84.
40 According to Article 16 of Regulation 1095/2010, guidelines and recommendations can
be implemented by national authorities following a specific procedure. For a list of di-
rectives and regulations adopted by the Commission, see ESMA, 2016, Questions and
Answer on the Market Abuse Regulation, 13 July 2016, ESMA /2016/1129. For the
guidelines see, ESMA, 2016, Final Report. Guidelines on theMarket Abuse Regulation –
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The core tenet of the European market abuse regime is prohibiting insider
dealing and unlawful disclosures of inside information. In particular, both pri-
mary and secondary insiders must not41 (a) engage or attempt to engage in in-
sider dealing,42 (b) recommend that another person engage in insider dealing or
induce another person to engage in insider dealing,43 (c) unlawfully disclose
inside information, except where the disclosure is made in the normal exercise
of an employment, a profession or duties.44
Additionally, in order to grant market egalitarianism and to prevent insider
trading, inside information should be disclosed as soon as possible.45 Such a
duty only concerns information related to an issuer (i.e. corporate informa-
tion), while mere market information is excluded.46 A disclosure of inside in-
formation, however, can be delayed (including cases of protracted processes)
when three conditions are met: (a) an immediate disclosure is likely to jeopar-
dize an issuer’s legitimate interest, (b) a delay of disclosure is not likely to mis-
lead the public and (c) the issuer is able to ensure the confidentiality of that
information.47
Interestingly, as we have seen above, when a piece of inside information is dis-
closed to selected third parties “in the normal course of exercise of an employ-
ment, profession or duties”, it also has to be disclosed to the public, unless the
recipient is bound by a duty of confidentiality based on law, regulations, arti-
cles of association or a contract.48 This provision is important for understand-
ing whether and to what extent selective disclosure of inside information is
allowed.49
market soundings and delay of disclosure of inside information, 13 July 2016, ESMA
/2016/1130.
41 Article 14.1. MAR; on primary and secondary insiders see Article 8.4. MAR.
42 Article 8.1. MAR.
43 Article 8.2. MAR.
44 Article 10.1. MAR.
45 Article 17 MAR.
46 It is to be stressed, however, that the difference between “corporate information” (i.e.
information directly concerning an issuer: Article 17.1. MAR) and “market informa-
tion” (i.e. information related to facts outside an issuer’s activity) is somewhat unclear.
47 Article 17.4. MAR.
48 Article 17.8. MAR (former Article 6.3. MAD).
49 This rule seems to be a legal transplant of Rule 100 of Regulation FD from the US (Reg-
ulation Fair Disclosure, on which see SEC, 1999, Release N. 34–42259, Selective Disclo-
sure and Insider Trading. Proposed Rule, FD 64, 248 72590) where it has its origin in the
capital market report system and not in the insider trading regulatory system; on which
point, see Holger Fleischer, “Investor Relations und informationelle Gleichbehandlung
im Aktien-, Konzern- und Kapitalmarktrecht”, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Ge-
sellschaftsrecht 2009, 505, 516. On Regulation FD see, Martin Bengtzen, “Private In-
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2.2. What Are Market Soundings?
According to Recital 32 MAR, market soundings “are interactions between a
seller of financial instruments and one or more potential investors, prior to the
announcement of a transaction, in order to gauge the interest of potential in-
vestors in a possible transaction and its pricing, size and structuring”.50 This
notion of market sounding reflects a broad spectrum of possible interactions
between a seller of financial instruments and potential investors regarding an
envisaged transaction. Market soundings, in particular, facilitate initial public
offers and secondary offers of securities. In both cases, the offer price should
match the value at which most investors are ready to subscribe or buy the of-
fered securities. In initial public offers, however, there is no market price of the
issued securities that can be used as a parameter or a benchmark in establishing
the issue price; in this context, the offeror needs to gauge the interests of po-
tential investors in order to establish the final issue price.51 In secondary offers,
by contrast, securities already have a market price to be used as a yardstick;
nevertheless, the offering company normally tries to gauge the interest of po-
tential investors in the offer’s conditions. Furthermore, when a company aims
at issuing a small amount of securities or at selling its own shares, public offers
are excessively lengthy and time-consuming, so companies often use a different
method, commonly called “placing” of securities or “accelerated bookbuild-
ings”, whereby issued securities are allotted to selected investors, normally
through an investment bank, in a short period of time (normally one day).52
Furthermore, individual shareholders seeking to sell their securities might also
vestor Meetings in Public Firms: The Case for Increasing Transparency”, Fordham
Journal of Corporate and Financial Law 2017, 33. In the US there is not a general duty
of full disclosure comparable to Article 17 MAR (on this point, see Ventoruzzo (fn. 28),
p. 14; SEC, Release N. 34–42259, 72591).
50 This Article is complemented by other provisions: (a) the Commission Implementing
Regulation (EU) 2016/959 of 17 May 2016 laying down implementing technical stan-
dards for market soundings with regard to the systems and notification templates to be
used by disclosing market participants and the format of the records in accordance with
Regulation (EU) No 96/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ
17.6.2016 L160/23 (hereinafter CIR 2016/959); (b) the Commission Delegated Regula-
tion (EU) 2016/960 supplementing Regulation (EU) No 96/2014 of the European Par-
liament and of the Council with regard to regulatory technical standards for the appro-
priate arrangements, systems and procedures for disclosing market participants
conducting market soundings, OJ 17.6.2016, L160/29 (hereinafter CDR 2016/906), as
“Level 2” regulations; (c) ESMA guidelines, ESMA/2016/1130 (n 36), being “Level 3”
implementing rules.
51 ABI, Encouraging Equity Investment: Facilitation of Efficient Equity Capital Raising in
the UK Market (July 2013) 13.
52 See Louise Gullifer/Jennifer Payne, Corporate Finance Law 2016, p. 480.
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selectively disclose inside information during an accelerated bookbuilding
with the aim of gauging “potential interest in those securities from other po-
tential investors”;53 in these latter cases, the troublesome issue is to justify a
shareholder’s being in possession of inside information about the company’s
business. In all these circumstances, the question arises as to whether a selective
dissemination of information, in order to gauge the interests of investors on the
offered securities, violates rules on insider dealing.54
Usually, in all possible business situations, the interaction between a seller and
potential investors prior to the formal conclusion of a deal includes prelimin-
ary contractual steps, which are aimed at aligning the different interests and at
reducing informational asymmetries.55 These interactions may give rise to sev-
eral critical issues related to possible exchanges of information. The first aim of
new rules on “market soundings” is, therefore, to clarify whether, and to what
extent, such selective disclosures do not infringe general insider trading princi-
ples.
A functional analysis reveals that there is no real contradiction between general
rules against insider trading,which focus on full disclosure of inside information
in order to grant equal access to information, and provisions on market sound-
ing. As is well known, insider trading in the last 60 years has been extensively
debated under legal, economic, as well as “law and economics”, perspectives.56
Themost common justification underpinning prohibition of insider trading and
rules on disclosure of inside information is the aim of reducing information
asymmetries, whichmight discourage potential investors and, as a consequence,
jeopardize market liquidity and efficiency. Market soundings, albeit involving
selective disclosures of (inside) information, might be beneficial when a transac-
tion only becomes feasible if the market actor gauges potential investors’ opi-
nions and identifies the price atwhich a given transaction can take place. Regula-
tions and, in general, institutional settings of financial markets should aim at en-
couraging investments and trust and at making market prices of securities to be
53 See Recital 33 MAR.
54 Regarding IPOs, it is worth remembering that the prohibition of insider dealing, indeed,
also applies to securities “in respect of which a request for admission to trading on [a
prescribed market] has been made”.
55 One may only think of the activity of due diligence as a mechanism designed to reduce
asymmetric information.
56 It is not possible here to provide a full overview of the literature on insider trading: see
Utpal Bhattacharya, “Insider Trading Controversies: A Literature Review”, Annual
Review of Financial Economics 2014, 385; see also Jonathan R. Macey, Insider Trading:
Economics, Politics and Policy, 1991; Stephen M. Bainbridge, Securities Law: Insider
Trading, 1999. A comparison between the US and the EU legal framework can be found
in Ventoruzzo (fn. 28).
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as efficient as possible.57 Therefore, to the extent thatmarket soundings serve the
purpose of increasing information exchanges between contractual parties, their
benefits are larger than their costs and market efficiency is likely to be in-
creased.58 Clearly, market soundings are not the only borderline situations
where a tension arises between full disclosure of inside information andprohibi-
tion of insider trading, on the one hand, and advantageous effects of communi-
catingorusing inside information for specific purposes, on theother hand. Prag-
matically, EU legislation tries to strike a balance between different purposes and
principles, by regulating various exceptions to its general principles.59
2.3. The Rules on Market Soundings
It is worth noting that the market sounding procedure is related to disclosures
of any information, regardless of whether it is “inside information” or not.
However, the procedural steps designed by the MAR are much more signifi-
cant when market sounding is related to pieces of inside information.60
57 Ronald J. Gilson/Reiner Kraakmann, “The mechanism of market efficiency”, Virginia
Law Review 1994, 549.
58 Dirk Zetzsche, “Normaler Geschäftsgang und Verschwiegenheit als Kriterien für die
Weitergabe transaktionsbezogener Insiderinformationen an Arbeitnehmer”, Neue
Zeitschrift für Gesellschaftsrecht 2015, 817, 820; See also Lombardo (fn. 13), 160. See
Recital 32 MAR: market soundings “are a highly valuable tool to gauge the opinion of
potential investors, enhance shareholder dialogue, ensure that deals run smoothly, and
that the views of issuers, existing shareholders and potential new investors are aligned.
They may be particularly beneficial when markets lack confidence or a relevant bench-
mark, or are volatile. Thus, the ability to conduct market soundings is important for the
proper functioning of financial markets and market soundings should not in themselves
be regarded as market abuse”.
59 Such exceptions are: (i) delay of disclosure of inside information (Article 17.4. MAR) on
which see Sergio Gilotta, “Disclosure in Securities Markets and the Firm’s Need for
Confidentiality: Theoretical Framework and Regulatory Analysis”, European Business
Organization Law Review 2012, 45; (ii) safe-harbors regarding buy-back programmes
and stabilization activity (Article 5 MAR) on which seeMathias Siems/Amedeo De Ce-
sari, “The Law and Finance of Share Repurchases in Europe”, Journal of Corporate Law
Studies 2012, 33 and Stefano Lombardo, “The Stabilisation of the Share Price of IPOs in
the United States and the European Union”, European Business Organization Law Re-
view 2007, 521 as well as Dmitri Boreiko/Stefano Lombardo, “Stabilisation Activity in
Italian IPOs”, European Business Organization Law Review 2011, 437; (iii) legitimate
behaviours under Article 9 MAR as previously foreseen in the recitals of
MAD. Furthermore, the general prohibition of market manipulation (Article 15 MAR)
knows some weakening in relation to accepted market practices (Article 13 MAR).
60 Recital 34 specifies that “conducting market soundings may require disclosure to poten-
tial investors of inside information”.
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Two parties are involved in market soundings: (i) a disclosing market partici-
pant who communicates information to (ii) investors, in order to gauge their
interests in a transaction. The disclosing market participant can be: (i) an issuer,
(ii) a secondary offeror of a financial instrument in such quantity or quality
that the transaction is distinct from ordinary trading and involves a selling
method based on the prior assessment of potential interest from potential in-
vestors.61 MAR places an obligation in particular on the disclosing market par-
ticipants.
Before engaging in a market sounding, the disclosing market participant has to
assess whether a disclosure of inside information will also be involved. In this
respect, disclosers should hold a written record of their conclusions and the
reasons thereof, and should inform the competent authority of any market
sounding procedure upon request. The framework requires this behaviour to
be taken for each disclosure of information throughout the course of the mar-
ket sounding.62 As we have seen above, market participants can only disclose
inside information (a) in the normal exercise of an employment, a profession or
a duty, and (b) if the recipient is bound by a confidentiality duty.63 In this re-
spect, Article 11 MAR explicitly clarifies that disclosure of inside information
made in the course of a market sounding procedure is deemed to be made “in
the normal exercise of an employment, a profession or duties”.64
Under the MAR, the question arises of whether the rule in theGrøngaard case
should continue to be applied in the new regulatory regime.65 Should the an-
swer be in the positive, the consequence would be that a market sounding
could only be undertaken if the disclosure is strictly necessary for implement-
ing the envisaged transaction.66 On the other hand, the MAR seems to follow a
formal approach, by maintaining that, when the offeror complies with the pro-
61 A disclosing market participant can also be an emission allowance market participant or
a third person acting on behalf or on account of the market sounding receiving the same
level of information.
62 Article 11.3. MAR.
63 Article 10.1. MAR.
64 Article 11.4. MAR and Recital 35 MAR. See also Tissen (fn. 13), 1255.
65 As mentioned, the ECJ in the Grøngaard and Bang case (fn. 14) decided that a piece of
information can be disclosed in the normal course of the exercise of an employment,
profession or duties if (i) there is a close link between the disclosure and the exercise of
the employment, profession or duties and (ii) the disclosure is strictly necessary for the
exercise of that employment, profession or duties.
66 See (with different opinions), Tissen (fn. 13), 1255; Dörte Poelzig, “Insider-und Markt-
manipulationsverbot im neuen Marktmissbrauchsrecht”, Neue Zeitschrift für Ge-
sellschaftsrecht 2016, 52, 53; Zetzsche (fn. 58), 819; Zetzsche, Die Aktiengesellschaft
2016, 610 (fn. 13), 613.
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cedural rules set forth in Article 11,67 a selective disclosure is deemed to be
made in the normal exercise of the discloser’s employment, profession or duty.
In other words, the satisfaction of the special procedural conditions set in Ar-
ticle 11 is likely to replace the requirements set forth by the ECJ in the
Grøngaard decision,68 or, at least, to put forward a strong presumption that,
by fulfilling the requirements of a market sounding procedure, a selective dis-
closure seeks to gauge the opinion of selected investors on a potential transac-
tion and is, therefore, lawful.69 This solution mirrors the British regime, in
which a disclosure is deemed to be made in the exercise of the discloser’s em-
ployment, profession or duties, among other factors, when it is “reasonable”
for the purpose of attaining an allowed purpose.70
When pieces of inside information are disclosed during a market sounding, the
disclosing party has to properly qualify its relationship with the recipient.71
The disclosing market participant, in particular, is required to (a) obtain the
consent of the recipient to receive inside information, (b) inform the recipient
that he or she is prohibited to conduct insider trading, (c) inform the recipient
to keep the information confidential.72 The disclosing market participant seems
to be free to select the recipients of disclosed information; it is however con-
troversial whether all recipients should receive equal treatment and the same
kind of information.73 The rationale of the MAR is to grant equal access and
market egalitarianism, thus this principle of equal treatment is paramount and
67 And, in particular, the application of Article 11.3. and 11.5. MAR as explicitly required
by Article 11.4. MAR.
68 The purpose of Article 11 MAR is to regulate market soundings that have the aim of
gauging the interests of possible transactions. See: Zetzsche , Die Aktiengesellschaft
2016, 610 (fn. 13), 613; Klaus J. Hopt/Christoph Kumpan, “Insidergeschäfte und Ad-
hoc-Publizität bei M&A – Unternehmenskäufe und Übernahmeangebote und Markt-
missbrauchsverordnung (MAR)”, Zeitschrift für Unternehmens- und Gesellschafts-
recht 2017, 765, 780;Giovanni Strampelli, “Knocking at the BoardroomDoor: ATrans-
atlantic Overview of Director-Institutional Investor Engagement in Law and Practice”,
Virginia Law and Business Review 2018, 187, 219.
69 Mosca (fn. 15), 845.
70 FSA/FCA guidelines MAR 1.4.5. as amended on 3/7/2016.
71 Article 11.5. MAR.
72 To the extent that the delay of information according to Article 17.4 is a prerequisite to
permit market soundings according to Article 17.8., the obligation of confidentiality
owed by the person receiving the information has to be qualified according to national
elements because the duty can be based on law, on regulations, on articles of association
or on a contract.
73 Indeed, the extent to which the persons receiving the market sounding with inside in-
formation receive the same amount (in terms of quality and quantity) of information is
doubtful at Level 1. At Level 2, Recital 1 and Article 3.5 of CDR 2016/960 specify that
all persons receiving the market information receive the same level of information.
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is to be applied also with regard to exceptions to the general rules entailed in
the regulation. As a consequence, any exception to the prohibitions of disclos-
ing inside information (such as the market sounding exception) also requires
that recipients should be treated equally and should receive identical (in terms
of quality and quantity) pieces of information.74
2.4. Market Soundings and Information
In a market sounding procedure, the disclosing market participant can com-
municate pieces of information that are not deemed “inside information”. In
this case, the discloser faces simplified duties regarding the minutes and the
records that are to be kept. In particular, the discloser should indicate that the
recipient is about to receive information that “the disclosing market participant
considers not to be inside information”75 and the recipient should consent to
such disclosure on a “non-wall-crossed” basis.76 By accepting a market sound-
ing, however, the recipient is not automatically safe, as he should “assess for
itself whether it is in possession of inside information or when it ceases to be in
possession of inside information”.77
Within this legal framework, the dissemination of inside information in a mar-
ket sounding procedure raises several controversial questions. The first issue is
the relationship between communication of inside information during a mar-
ket sounding and the cases when companies are allowed to delay a disclosure
of inside information (hereunder paragraph a). Once this preliminary question
is clarified, we can address other issues, namely: whether a transaction dis-
cussed during a market sounding is to be held as inside information (hereunder
paragraph b); whether a transaction that requires several steps78 should be con-
sidered inside information before it is eventually finalised and upon one of the
intermediate steps (hereunder paragraph c); which pieces of inside information
are to be communicated (hereunder paragraph d).
74 See also Zetzsche , Die Aktiengesellschaft 2016, 610 (fn. 13), 614.
75 CIR 2016/959 annex II, vi.
76 Article 11.5.1(a) MAR and Article 3.3(g) CIR 2016/960.
77 Article 11.7. MAR.
78 Article 7.2. and 7.3. MAR.
323Market Soundings: United Kingdom and ItalyECFR 3/2019
Brought to you by | School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/7/19 9:56 AM
a. Market Soundings and the Reasons for Delaying Disclosures of
Inside Information
The disclosure of inside information in the context of a market sounding is
likely to require that the prerequisites occur for legitimately delaying its dis-
closure according to Article 17.4 MAR.79 Indeed, MAR requires full disclosure
of information as an incentive to avoid insider trading; at the same time, it
allows the delaying of such disclosure in specific circumstances. In particular,
as we mentioned above, a delay is justified (a) if a prompt disclosure is likely to
jeopardize legitimate interests of the issuer, (b) if a delay of disclosure is not
likely to mislead the public and (c) if the issuer is able to ensure the confidenti-
ality of that information. In sum, it appears that the communication of inside
information in the context of a market sounding can be legitimately underta-
ken only when a delay of disclosure is justified under Article 17.4 MAR.
b. The Envisaged Transaction Is Per Se a Piece of Inside Information
The operation disclosed in a market sounding is to be considered inside infor-
mation when its realisation is almost certain. In this case, the envisaged transac-
tion fulfils all four elements of the definition of inside information and, as a
consequence, it should be disclosed to the market.80 A typical example is when
directors of a listed company have reached an agreement on a capital increase,
but have not yet taken an official decision. In this case, the issuing company has
an interest in capturing the opinion of potential investors on this transaction’s
conditions. In such a situation, information on an imminent secondary offer-
79 The relation between market soundings and delay of information according to Arti-
cle 17.4. MAR is also stressed by Di Noia/Milic/Spatola (fn. 6), 102; Lombardo (fn. 13),
163; Zetzsche, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2016, 610 (fn. 13), 613. ESMA does not explicitly
consider the relation between market soundings and delay of information in its guide-
lines. Indeed, ESMA does not directly specify that the transactions in which market
soundings are conducted could justify delay. There is an indirect reference to delay of
information in the context of a market sounding only in ESMA/2014/809, 23 Nr. 74.
80 See the Harrison case decided by the FSA in September 2008. Mr Harrison, an invest-
ment manager, was informed about the imminent refinancing of Rhodia SA in a kind of
market sounding and used this inside information (disclosed later on) to trade on it. Mr
Harrison was informed about the operation in a kind of market sounding: “Credit
Suisse contacted Mr Harrison in order to help establish the correct pricing and other
feedback on the specifics of the proposed refinancing which involved the tender for
certain of its existing bonds and the issue of new floating rate notes. This necessitated
providing Mr Harrison with inside information regarding the proposed refinancing”,
see FSA, 2008, Final Notice, (https://www.fca.org.uk/publication/final-notices/steven_
harrison.pdf, 2.2.1., last visited: 5 February 2019).
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ing of securities is to be classified “inside information”, which the issuer should
immediately disclose to the market. In this scenario, any selective communica-
tion of the plan of issuing shares risks violating the prohibition of “insider
trading”. As mentioned in point (a), the disclosure of inside information about
a capital increase to selected investors is only acceptable under the conditions
set forth in article 17.4 MAR.
c. The Envisaged Transaction Is the Outcome of Many Intermediate Steps
Contrary to the case discussed in point (b), in which a transaction has been
already decided and is deemed inside information, other transactions might
require several steps to be eventually decided.81 Therefore, the question arises
of when such operations become sufficiently certain to be treated as inside in-
formation. A typical example is the situation when executive directors aim at
increasing their company’s capital and in order to reach this goal they need to
convince other directors and a majority of shareholders, since such a decision
requires the intervention of both the board of directors and the general meet-
ing of shareholders. In that case, executive directors inform selected large
shareholders of a possible capital increase, in order to gauge their opinion and
their availability to vote in favour of this proposal and, eventually, to subscribe
new shares. This communication does not involve a disclosure of inside infor-
mation, since this capital increase also depends on what the recipient share-
holders are going to decide on its merit and, therefore, it is far from being
certain at the moment of its disclosure.82 On the other hand, it is desirable
avoiding that shareholders who were sounded out speculate on the basis of this
information; hence, as soon as a capital increase becomes reasonably certain
(for instance, because most shareholders have positively reacted to such a pro-
posal) this transaction is to be deemed inside information.83
In this context, the question arises as to whether the fact that a person uses his
or her own knowledge on how he or she will behave regarding a certain market
transaction should be deemed inside information. In our case, shareholders
81 Regarding intermediate steps, see Sergio Gilotta/Federico Raffaele, “Informazione pri-
vilegiata e “processi prolungati” dopo la Market Abuse Regulation”, Rivista delle Soci-
età 2018, 83.
82 This kind of information about a possible increase in capital could be qualified as “soft
information” according to the proposal of the European Commission where the infor-
mation is not precise but of potential interest for a reasonable investor.
83 See Lombardo (fn. 13), 163; Hopt/Kumpan (fn. 68), 809. Apparently, ESMA does not
consider this issue and the deriving hypothesis of inside information but recital 1 of CIR
2016/959 considers the possibility that the nature of information changes after the mar-
ket sounding, so implicitly admitting the potential problem.
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who were sounded out could speculate by using their knowledge on their own
decisions.84 This question has not been yet fully clarified, albeit the MAR
seems to answer in the negative by maintaining that “the mere fact that a per-
son uses its own knowledge that it has decided to acquire or dispose of finan-
cial instruments in the acquisition or disposal of those financial instruments
shall not of itself constitute use of inside information”.85 What matters for the
purposes of this article is that recipients of market soundings should assess by
themselves whether they are in possession of inside information or when they
cease being in possession of inside information.86 This is a catch-all provision
that puts a precise obligation on any persons receiving a market sounding.87
This provision is crucial for addressing market operations requiring several
steps and for clarifying whether a piece of information becomes inside infor-
mation due to an active involvement of the sounded party.
d. Disclosure of Many Pieces of Inside Information
When potential investors are sounded out regarding an envisaged transaction,
the issuer or seller might disclose several different pieces of inside information.
In these cases, it is to be assessed whether each piece of information falls within
the scope of Article 11 MAR or not. Such assessment is to be conducted on a
case-by-case basis, so that no comprehensive taxonomy seems to be feasible.88
84 In the example, the shareholders are sounded out according to Article 11 and contribute
to create and possess the inside information being persons “having a holding in the ca-
pital of the issuer”, according to Article 8.4(b) MAR. This issue (commonly labelled
“insider of itself”) is of particular relevance for takeover regulation and the Italian Corte
di Cassazione has recently deemed it compatible with the MAD (presumably also with
the MAR): see Stefano Lombardo, “L’insider di se stesso alla luce della decisione della
Cassazione (civile)”, Giurisprudenza Commerciale 2018, II/666.
85 Article 9.5. MAR.
86 Article 11.7. MAR.
87 This is the case although, in the market sounding regulatory framework, duties are
mostly allocated on disclosing market participants. Note that the Article starts with the
words “Notwithstanding the provisions of this Article, ...”, which means that the re-
quirement of this provision does not only refer to Article 10.5 MAR but to the entire
Article. On the importance of Article 11.7. MAR, see also Zetzsche, Die Aktienge-
sellschaft 2016, 610 (fn. 13), 618. Additionally, it is worth noting that article 11.7. MAR
seems to replicate the content of Article 8.4. last sentence, which provided the general
principle that “This Article also applies to any person who possesses inside information
under circumstances other than those referred to in the first subparagraph where that
person knows or ought to know that it is inside information”.
88 See ESMA/2014/809, 23 Nr. 74, on this specific issue see also Zetzsche, Die Aktienge-
sellschaft 2016, 610 (fn. 13), 619.
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In this regard, when the disclosed information is related to the envisaged trans-
action, such disclosure falls within the scope of Article 11 MAR, while in any
other cases it is to be treated as an unlawful disclosure of inside information.89
2.5. Market Soundings in Three Situations
As we have mentioned above, we aim at assessing whether market soundings
can be carried out through a disclosure of inside information in three specific
cases.
a. Secondary Offerings
Market soundings may occur during secondary offerings (also called “sea-
soned offerings” in business jargon), when an already listed company seeks to
increase its capital. In this transaction, securities regulation and company law
are strictly intertwined, and such a connection raises several problems with
respect to market soundings, as we shall see hereunder.
b. Accelerated Bookbuilding when the Offeror Is the Company
Recital 33 MAR describes a case of accelerated boobuilding as follows: “where
the sell-side analyst is seeking to sell a large amount of securities on behalf of an
investor and seeks to gauge potential interest in those securities from other
potential investors”. Article 11.1 MAR clarifies this description by stating that
a market sounding is made by secondary offerors of a financial instrument,
when the offer is “in such quantity or value that the transaction is distinct from
ordinary trading and involves a selling method based on the prior assessment
of potential interest from potential investors”.90 A company that holds own
89 See ESMA/2014/809, 23 Nr. 74; Zetzsche, Die Aktiengesellschaft 2016, 610 (fn. 13), 619.
90 Importantly, we note that the Italian version of the MAR slightly departs from the Eng-
lish, German and French versions: while the Italian version refers to offerors in the sec-
ondary markets, which seem to be distinguished from the secondary offerors, the other
versions employ the notion of “secondary offeror” (Italian: un offerente sul mercato
secondario di uno strumento finanziario; English: a secondary offeror of a financial in-
strument; French: par un offreur secondaire d’un instrument financie; German: einen
Zweitanbieter eines Finanzinstruments). Zetzsche, in: Gebauer/Teichmann (ed.), En-
zyklopädie Europarecht (fn. 13), at para 217b, describes the situation of a block trade in
which a large number of shares are placed outside any regulated market; such a transac-
tion (which amount to about 0.5% of shares’ value) can have a negative impact upon
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shares as treasury shares91 or seeks to issue new shares, might implement an
accelerated bookbuilding in order to quickly allot such shares among selected
investors. In a typical accelerated bookbuilding, the selling party asks an in-
vestment bank to find potential investors for the shares at a selling price de-
fined by testing the potential interest of the investors.92 The reason for using
this mechanism is that the offering of a consistent number of shares usually
depresses the price of these shares. Because of this consequence arising from
the large amount of offered shares, the equilibrium price of an accelerated
bookbuilding is likely to be lower than the listing price and higher than the
price that would be reached by selling on the market.93
Instead of undertaking an accelerated bookbuilding, listed companies might
either: (a) sell shares directly on a regulated market,94 or (b) engage in a public
offer of securities. Alternative (b) is based on general principles of full disclo-
sure, which is normally undertaken by publishing a prospectus and under a
general duty of equal treatment.95 In both cases, the issuer should fully disclose
inside information and the question arises as to whether the same principles to
be followed in such transactions have to be applied to the accelerated book-
building cases. Should the answer be in the positive, the consequence would
be that, during an accelerated bookbuilding, the issuer should fully disclose
inside information to the market before the deal becomes effective, albeit such
information having been previously disclosed to selected institutional inves-
tors.
market liquidity. Block trades are types of accelerated secondary offerings: Bernardo
Bortolotti/William Megginson/Scott B. Smart, “The Rise of Accelerated Seasoned Equi-
ty Underwritings”, Journal of Applied Corporate Finance 2008, 35, 37.
91 The second company law Directive allows issuers to hold their own shares as treasury
shares but only up to a certain limit in order to avoid problems with the regime of capital
and capital maintenance, which is a core element of European company law. See in par-
ticular, Article 22 et seq. of Directive 2012/30/EU of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 25 October 2012 on coordination of safeguards which, for the protection of
the interests of members and others, are required byMember States of companies within
the meaning of the second paragraph of Article 54 of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union, in respect to the formation of public limited liability companies
and the maintenance and alteration of their capital, with a view to making such safe-
guards equivalent, OJ 14.11.2012 L315/74.
92 On accelerated bookbuilding offerings (ABO) see Bortolotti/Megginson/Smart (fn. 90),
passim.
93 The final price depends on several variables related e.g. to liquidity of the shares, amount
sold, ability of the investment bank etc.
94 This strategy risks depressing share price.
95 This strategy is more costly and time-consuming than other strategies.
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c. Accelerated Bookbuilding When the Offeror Is a Shareholder
Investment banks can also be entrusted with the task to find potential investors
by shareholders who aim at selling their shares in a listed company. In this
situation, it is natural that the investment bank sounds out potential investors,
and yet it is unclear whether it can also disclose inside information related to
the issuing company. Selling shareholders can acquire information about their
company either on the basis of their holding capital of the issuing company96
or because of their being members of corporate bodies.97 Selling shareholders
should comply with general rules on insider trading, unless they trigger a mar-
ket sounding procedure under Article 11 MAR.
The communication of inside information between the selling shareholder and
the potential investor(s) aims at balancing information asymmetry and in-
creases the deal’s efficiency. The selling shareholder communicates to the po-
tential buying party inside information about the issuing company in order to
establish the most efficient price, which includes this piece of inside informa-
tion. Nevertheless, the general prohibition of insider trading would jeopardize
the effective conclusion of the deal before the listed company publicly informs
the market. In this case, only the company can legitimately disclose a piece of
inside information that was transmitted by a selling shareholder to potential
investors. Obviously, if the company refuses to disclose the inside information
invoking the delay according to Article 17.5. MAR, the deal cannot occur. As a
result, the conclusion is that the hypothesis described in Article 11.1.b. re-
quires the previous disclosure by the listed company of the inside information
communicated by the secondary offeror to potential investors.
3. Market Soundings and National Company Law Regimes
From a company law standpoint, market sounding raises different problems,
whose solutions, as we shall see, might not be entirely compatible with the
procedure entailed in the MAR. To understand these issues, we should distin-
guish activities undertaken by the issuing company before a secondary offer of
securities, from activities undertaken by a company’s shareholders when they
decide to sell their shares.
Before public offers, companies’ managers or other fiduciaries sound out the
market by meeting selected investors to gauge their interest in subscribing
newly issued securities or treasury shares and their view on such transactions.
96 Article 8.4(b) MAR.
97 Article 8.4(a) MAR.
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As we have seen in the previous section, when directors engage in market
sounding, information is disseminated to selected potential investors, be they
shareholders or not. When the company, or a company’s agent, decides to
sound out selected shareholders, the latter receive more pieces of information
than other fellow-shareholders; although sounded shareholders voluntarily ac-
cept to receive inside information, and suffer the disadvantage of not being able
to trade after this disclosure, they are objectively treated differently from other
shareholders, whom the company does not offer the same option in the first
place; hence the question arises as to whether shareholders can be discrimi-
nated according to their sophistication or the quantity of shares owned. By
contrast, when third parties are sounded out, the question arises as to whether
a company can disclose inside information to third parties in order to facilitate
share acquisitions. By contrast, pre-marketing activities undertaken by a share-
holder who seeks to sell his or her shares in the market do not involve direc-
tors’ relation with shareholders or the question of whether and under which
circumstances discriminations may be justified, and yet other “company law”
questions may arise. First of all, it is to be clarified whether shareholders owe
each other duties of fair or equal treatment; secondly, the question arises as to
whether their company can or should cooperate with them by facilitating a
disclosure of inside information. Despite capital markets being increasingly
globalized, most rules governing intra-corporate affairs, such as the relations
between directors and shareholders and relations among shareholders, are na-
tion-based and depend on each country’s company law regimes. As a conse-
quence, national regimes might have an impact on uniform rules such as those
provided in the MAR.
In this regard, it is worth remembering that inside information can be disclosed
“in the normal exercise of an employment, profession or duty”. In these cases,
the issuer should also make complete and effective public disclosure of that
information, unless the recipient owes a duty of confidentiality.98 Interestingly,
the Market Abuse Regulation maintains that any disclosures of inside informa-
tion that respect market sounding procedures are deemed to be made in the
normal exercise of an employment, profession or duty.99 Such disclosures,
however, might violate national company law even though market soundings
procedures are fully respected. Therefore, directors and other company’s
agents should assess whether, and in which circumstances, domestic company
law rules allow selective disclosures, even when they comply with provisions
regulating market sounding procedures.
98 Article 17.8. MAR.
99 Article 11.4. MAR.
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In general, we can expect that national company law rules prohibit directors
from discriminating between shareholders. The main reason is that directors’
powers, however constructed, derive from shareholders’ positions,100 with the
consequence that the former must not behave arbitrarily vis-à-vis their share-
holders. Additionally, even if discriminations are allowed, it is reasonable to
expect that the applicable company law regime requires that such discrimina-
tion be supported by specific justifications for the benefit of the company as a
whole.101 However, the precise contours of these limits on directors’ powers
vary across jurisdictions. On this point, it is worth mentioning that EU law
does not impose a strict duty of equal treatment of shareholders. The ECJ, in
the Audiolux case, argued that the principle of equal treatment of shareholders
who are in the same position is not a general principle of EU law.102 Addition-
ally, according to Advocat General Trstenjak, in the case Commission v Spain
discussing pre-emption rights granted to holders of bonds convertible to
shares, the principle of equal treatment of shareholders, “is not construed as an
obligation on the part of the company to treat shareholders in the same way,
but is understood to mean that unequal treatment needs sufficiently objective
justification”.103 Similarly, the question of whether shareholders owe reciprocal
duties of “fairness” even when they act as individuals (such as in secondary
offers) is also governed by national company law rules that vary from country
to country. In the next pages, we will address director duties in Italy and the
U.K., in order to assess whether these national company law regimes could
block market soundings or affect their feasibility.
100 For an overview of different constructions of shareholders’ positions in the company
see,Mathias Siems, Convergence in Shareholder Law, 2008, 60.
101 Nicola De Luca, “Unequal Treatment and Shareholders”Welfare Growth. ‘Fairness’ v.
‘Precise Equality’”, Delaware J. Corporation Law 2009, 853; Mosca (fn. 15), 830;
Strampelli (fn. 68), 222.
102 ECJ, 15 October 2009, Audiolux SA v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert SA (GBL), C-108/
08, ECLI:EU:C:2009:626, on which see Federico M. Mucciarelli, “Equal treatment of
shareholders and European Union law”, European Company and Financial Law Re-
view 2010, 158. See also ECJ, 19 December 2013, Alfred Hirmann v Immofinanz AG,
C-174/12 ECLI:EU:C:2013:856, para. 27, which maintained that the principle of equal
treatment only regulates “the legal relationships established between the company and
its shareholders which derive exclusively from the memorandum and Articles of asso-
ciation”, with the consequence of a duty to pay damages to shareholders resulting from
the dissemination of false information.
103 ECJ, 18 December 2008, Commission v Spain, C-338/06, ECLI:EU:C:2008:740. On
the scope of EU principle of equal treatment see Giovanni Strampelli, “Rendering
(Once More) the Financial Assistance Regime More Flexible”, European Company
and Financial Law Review 2012, 530, 545–546.
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3.1. Italy
a. The Market Abuse Regime
The Italian market abuse regime is traditionally based on a dual system, which
includes both criminal and administrative sanctions.104, 105 Before the MAR en-
tered into force, selective disclosures were only lawful when they were made in
the “normal exercise of an employment, a profession or duties”.106 This issue
was only posed with regard to IPOs and share issues with a prospectus,
104 Legislative Decree N. 58/1998, as amended, hereinafter the “Unified Act on Finance”.
On this dual system, and its questionable legitimacy, see Marco Ventoruzzo, Do Mar-
ket Abuse Rules Violate Human Rights? The Grande Stevens v. Italy Case, ECGI Law
Working Paper, 2014 (https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2517760,
last visited: 5 February 2019); Francesco Mucciarelli, Illecito penale, illecito amminis-
trativo e ne bis in idem: la Corte di Cassazione e i criteri di stretta connessione e di
proporzionalità, www.penalecontemporaneo.it, 17 October 2018 (https://www.penale
contemporaneo.it/d/6272-illecito-penale-illecito-amministrativo-e-ne-bis-in-idem-la-
corte-di-cassazione-e-i-criteri-di-stre, last visited: 5 February 2019); The legislative de-
cree 107/2018 has confirmed the dual system, on which see Francesco Mucciarelli, Gli
abusi di mercato riformati e le persistenti criticità di una disciplina, www.penalecontem
poraneo.it, 10 October 2018 (https://www.penalecontemporaneo.it/d/6249-gli-abusi-
di-mercato-riformati-e-le-persistenti-criticita-di-una-tormentata-disciplina, last vis-
ited: 5 February 2019).
105 Unified Act on Finance, Article 187-bis.
106 Article 184(1)(b) Unified Act on Finance (implementing MADArticle 3(a), nowMAR
Article 10). Due to a reform of 2005, the “normal exercise of an employment, a profes-
sion or duties” has become an element (the actus reus) which is to be proven by the
public prosecutor, while previous rules only exempted disclosures made with a “justi-
fied motivation” that had to be proven by the defendant: Statute n. 262/2005, 28 Janu-
ary 2005, Luigi Foffani, Art. 184, in: Francesco Vella (ed.), Commentario T.U.F., 2012,
vol. 2, p. 1778; Stefania Giavazzi, L’abuso di informazioni privilegiate, in: Giovanni
Canzio/Luigi Domenico Cerqua/Luca Lupária (ed.), Diritto penale delle società,
2016, p. 705. The same piece of information should be simultaneously disclosed to the
market, unless the recipient was bound by a confidentiality commitment based upon a
statutory rule or a private agreement: Article 114.4 Unified Act on Finance (imple-
menting Article 6.3 MAD, repealed through Art. 3 legislative decree 107/2018). CON-
SOB Communication DME/6027054, 28th March 2006, para. 52. See, Enrico Macrì,
Informazioni privilegiate e disclosure, 2010, p. 95; Sergio Gilotta, Trasparenza e riser-
vatezza nella società quotata, 2012, p. 168; Paolo Montalenti, “Disclosure e riservatezza
nei mercati finanziari: problemi aperti”, Analisi giuridica dell’economia 2013, 245, 251;
Giovanni Strampelli, “L’informazione societaria a quindici anni dal T.U.F.: profili evo-
lutivi e problemi”, Rivista delle società 2014, 991, 1041. Criminal sanctions only apply
to actions committed by “primary insiders”, such as members of a company’s board or
other corporate bodies, or by shareholders of the issuing company; administrative
sanctions apply to any person who is in possession of inside information, even if this
was communicated by a primary insider. On selective disclosures in the “pre-market-
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whereas accelerated bookbuildings of listed companies do not seem to have
been implemented in Italy.107 Italian scholars and courts have acknowledged
that the concept of “normal exercise of an employment, a profession or duties”
includes disclosures that are essential elements of a profession, such as disclo-
sure of information to a trading company or a law firm, and disclosures of
information within a company or within a group of companies if they are
aimed at drafting the group’s consolidated accounts.108 Additionally, no doubts
have ever arisen on whether inside information can be selectively disclosed to
experts or financial and legal consultants to gauge their opinion on a com-
pany’s financial or legal situation.109 Interestingly, the Italian supervisory
authority has also held that issuers can selectively disclose inside information
to any subjects with whom negotiations related to commercial or financial
transactions are on-going.110 Therefore, selective disclosures and “market
soundings”, aimed at gauging the opinions of potential investors, could be
compatible with the previous Market Abuse regime, within the limits de-
scribed so far, even if no explicit provision existed.111
Furthermore, the provisions on disclosure of inside information have been re-
cently amended to make direct reference to notions entailed in the MAR.112 In
particular, it has been clarified that disclosures are not only allowed when made
in the normal exercise of an employment, a profession or duties, but also in a
market sounding procedure according to the MAR.113 Despite this clarifica-
ing” phase of an IPO, see Stefano Lombardo, Quotazione in borsa e stabilizzazione del
prezzo delle azioni, 2011, p. 236.
107 See Borsa Italiana at http://www.borsaitaliana.it/notizie/sotto-la-lente/accelerated-bo
okbuild-157.htm, last visited: 5 February 2019.
108 Giavazzi (fn. 106), p. 706–707. See, however, Gilotta (fn. 106), p. 167: selective disclo-
sure is only allowed in the same circumstances in which an issuer can delay disclosing
that information, namely in order to avoid a prejudice to legitimate interests of the
company, as specified by the CONSOB Regulation on Issuers (n. 11971/1999, as
amended) art. 66-bis.
109 Armoando Bartulli/Mario Romano, “Sulla disciplina penale dell’insider trading (legge
17 maggio 1991, n. 157)”, Giurisprudenza Commerciale (1992), 660, 665 (which was
related to previous rules, but is likely to be applied under the new formula).
110 CONSOB DME/6027054 28 March 2006 § 52; see Sergio Gilotta, Art. 114, in: Fran-
cesco Vella (ed.), Commentario T.U.F., 2012, vol. 2, p. 1163.
111 The general definition of “inside information” also includes circumstances that “may
reasonably be expected to come into existence”, such as a plan for issuing new shares
that has not been yet approved by the general meeting of shareholders and is only dis-
cussed informally at board level: Article 181/3(a), Unified Act on Finance, implement-
ing Article 1 of Directive 2003/124/EC; see Andrea F. Tripodi, Informazioni privilegi-
ate e statuto penale del mercato finanziario, 2012, p. 221.
112 See art. 114 Unified Act on Finance, as amended by Art. 3 legislative decree 107/2018.
113 Art. 184.1(b) Unified Act on Finance.
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tion, however, Italian company law rules and principles might put some obsta-
cles in the way of secondary offers and accelerated bookbuildings.
b. Directors’ Duties and the Principle of Equal Treatment of Shareholders
According to the Italian Civil Code, shares grant to their owners the same
rights, unless the articles of association create special classes of shares.114 In this
regard, scholars debate on whether directors of Italian companies are bound by
a general principle of equal treatment of all shareholders in any circumstances.
Several authors answer in the negative, holding that minorities would only be
protected through fairness standards or by the prohibition of abusive oppres-
sion, not by a strict overarching principle of equality.115 Other opinions main-
tain that a general principle of equal treatment is implicit in companies’ con-
tractual nature and is to be derived from the general principle of shares’ equal-
ity.116
Listed companies, however, should comply with an additional statutory duty
of equal treatment of all security holders, which protects both shareholders
and bond-holders.117 This rule was expanded in 2007 to include a right of se-
curity holders to be equally given sufficient information for exercising their
corporate rights.118 Despite this provision being introduced to comply with the
principle of equal treatment entailed in the second company law directive119, its
114 Article 2348 Italian Civil Code. See Carlo Angelici, Parità di trattamento degli azionis-
ti, in: Carlo Angelici/ Giovanni B. Ferri, Studi sull’autonomia dei privati, 1997, p. 416;
Floriano D’Alessandro, “La seconda direttiva e la parità di trattamento degli azionisti”,
Rivista delle società (1987), 1.
115 See e.g. Angelici (fn. 114), p. 420; Giorgio Marasà, Modifiche al contratto sociale, in:
Giovanni E. Colombo/Giuseppe B. Portale (ed.), Trattato delle società per azioni,
1993, vol. 7(1), p. 107; De Luca (fn. 101), 885; Id. “Premi di fedeltà ed eguaglianza tra
azionisti: riflessioni sull’art. 127-quater tuf”, Rivista del Diritto Societario 2012, 23.
116 Disiano Preite, Abuso di maggioranza e conflitto d’interessi, in: Colombo/Portale
(ed.), Trattato delle società per azioni, 1993, vol. 3(2), p. 37–42 (prohibition of discri-
minations in any situation deriving from the company’s constitution, such as lengths of
speeches during a general meeting, directors’ refusal to register a share purchase, or
amendments of the original Articles of association); Gian Carlo M. Rivolta, Diritto
delle società – Profili generali, in: Vincenzo Buonocore/Renzo Costi (ed.), Trattato di
diritto commerciale, 2015, p. 232; Giacomo D’Attorre, Il principio d’eguaglianza tra
soci nelle società per azioni, 2007, p. 297–307 (with regard to selective disclosure).
117 Article 92.1. Unified Act on Finance.
118 Article 92.2. Unified Act on Finance, as amended by Article 1 Legislative decree 195/
2007.
119 Article 42 Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976 (now Article 85, Directive (EU)
2017/1132 of 14 June 2017 relating to certain aspects of company law (codification).
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scope is not limited to the topics regulated in that directive and is drafted as a
general principle. Therefore, most scholars maintain that listed companies that
seek to issue new shares must not disclose information on the envisaged trans-
actions to selected shareholders.120 Under such a strict application of the equal-
ity principle, selective disclosures would not be deemed “in the normal exer-
cise” of directors’ duties.121 Other scholars, however, have recently argued that
selective disclosures are compatible with the principle of equal treatment when
such disclosures are necessary for a transaction to succeed, provided that the
recipients do not abuse inside information and signs a confidentiality agree-
ment.122 The reason is that the principle of equal treatment protects holders of
any kind of securities, not only shareholders, and is to be also applied to for-
eign issuers listed in an Italian regulated market, not only to Italian companies.
The aim of the principle of equality is, therefore, protecting a security’s “ex-
change value” and maximizing security holders’ chances of buying and selling
their shares.123 This solution, however, is still controversial. What emerges
clearly is the continuing debate among Italian scholars and practitioners, and
discord as to whether the principle of equality is to be relaxed in order to allow
market transactions to succeed.
c. Shareholders’ Preemptive Right
A further question is under which circumstances Italian company law rules
and principles allow domestic companies to exclude or limit preemptive rights
on newly issued shares. This issue is obviously relevant for both offers to the
public and allotments to selected shareholders. In general, a company can le-
gitimately exclude or limit shareholders’ preemptive rights when the “interest
of the company requires such exclusion”.124 In this regard, Italian law has in-
creasingly simplified the disapplication of preemptive right. While older case
120 Francesco Mucciarelli, “L’informazione societaria: destinatari e limiti posti dalla norma-
tiva in materia di insider trading”, Banca borsa titoli di credito (1999), I/745, 746;Um-
berto Belviso, “L’informazione dei soci nelle società con azioni quotate”, Rivista delle
Società 2004, 827, 861;D’Attorre (fn. 116), p. 299;Macrì (fn. 106), p. 96.
121 See Giavazzi (fn. 106), p. 708.
122 Andrea Giannelli/Chiara Mosca, Flussi informativi tra amministratori e soci nella so-
cietà quotata, tra ambiguità ed esigenze di disciplina, Working Paper 2012, p. 35, (htt
p://orizzontideldirittocommerciale.it/media/11996/giannelli_andrea_-_mosca_chiara.
pdf, last visited: 5 February 2019; Chiara Mosca, “Comunicazione selettiva degli am-
ministratori agli azionisti nella società per azioni quotata”, Rivista delle Società 2018,
29.
123 See Federico M. Mucciarelli, “Sulla parità di trattamento nelle società quotate”, Rivista
delle Società 2004, 180, 198.
124 Article 2441.5 Civil Code.
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law allowed such disapplication only when necessary to pursue the interests of
the company (i.e., only if the exclusion is necessary for the company’s survi-
val)125, most recent authorities follow a liberal path, by accepting that share-
holders’ preemptive right can also be waived when preferable to pursuing the
company’s business strategies.126 Additionally, a reform of 2014 lowered the
majority requirements to approve a disapplication of preemptive right.127 It is
worth remembering that companies should allot new shares with a premium
that reflect the company’s “real” value,128 although discounts from the market
price are allowed to facilitate shares’ allotment and seem to be quite com-
mon.129 More importantly, according to the Italian Civil Code, listed compa-
nies can issue new shares without preemptive right if their offering price is
equivalent to their market price and the total amount of newly issued shares is
not more than 10% of the legal capital.130 The reason is that, when the issue
price is nearly equal to the shares’ market price, shareholders can keep their
position in the company by purchasing shares or by subscribing the newly
issued shares. What is still uncertain and debated, however, is whether the
125 See Pier Giusto Jaeger, L’interesse sociale, 1963, p. 220;Giuseppe Ferri, Le società, 1987,
p. 929; Roberto Rosapepe, L’esclusione del diritto d’opzione, 1988, p. 54.
126 See e.g.: Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation), 13 January 1987,
Le Società 1987, 291; Corte Suprema di Cassazione (Supreme Court of Cassation),
23 March 1993, n. 3458, Giurisprudenza Commerciale 1994, II/372. Franco Di Sabato,
Manuale delle società, 1995, p. 679; Gian Franco Campobasso, Diritto commerciale,
2015, vol. 2, p. 511. See also: Nicola Robiglio, “Delega dell’aumento del capitale e D.P.
R. n. 30/1986”, Rivista delle Società 1991, 657, 681; Federico M. Mucciarelli, “Interesse
sociale ed esclusione del diritto di opzione: spunti di riflessione sulla logica dell’argo-
mentazione del giudice”, Giurisprudenza Commerciale 2002, I/455; Enrico Ginevra,
Diritto d’opzione, in: Pietro Abbadessa/Giuseppe B. Portale (ed.), La società per azio-
ni, 2016, vol. 2: the limitation of pre-emptive right is justified when it is necessary to
pursue a specific business choice or strategy.
127 L. 116/2014 amending Article 2441.6 Civil Code. Before 2014, such decisions had to be
approved by shareholders representing at least half of the legal capital, on top of the
supermajority requirements for amending the Articles (2/3 of the represented capital).
128 Article 2441.6 Civil Code.
129 Giuseppe B. Portale, “Opzione e sovrapprezzo nella novella azionaria”, Giurispruden-
za Commerciale 1975, I/222. See, for instance, the raising of new capital of Unicredit in
2017, for shares were issued at a discount of 38% to the theoretical ex-right price
(“TERP”). The TERP is the price of the shares immediately prior to announcement
adjusted for the dilution caused by the rights issue. On the recent problem of diluition
in capital increases, see Enrico R. Restelli, “Finanziamento dell’impresa e coazione a
sottoscrivere. Gli aumenti di capitale iperdilutivi”, Osservatorio del diritto civile e
commerciale 2018, 547.
130 Article 2441.4 Civil Code.
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company must necessarily issue these new shares to the public131 or can select
investors through a private offer of shares or a bookbuilding procedure.132
In general, when a company decides to waive shareholders’ preemptive right
(under one of the conditions mentioned above) and to allot new shares to se-
lected investors, instead of offering them to the public, the question arises
whether such allotment might violate company law principles. Legal scholars
seem to accept the idea that such selective allocations of shares may be allowed,
provided that they are justified under one of the specific conditions mentioned
above.133 Eventually, when shares are issued to directors or other “related par-
ties”, such allotment should also respect the special proceedings for related
parties’ transactions, which are based upon a non-binding opinion of a com-
mittee of non-executive directors.134
d. Sale of Treasury Shares
Furthermore, we should address the sale of shares held by a company as treas-
ury shares. This decision poses the question whether these shares are to be
offered to shareholders in a way that does not undermine their position in the
company or that does not discriminate certain shareholders.135 A sale of treas-
ury shares, in particular, alters the position of shareholders in their company
similarly to an issue of new shares. This issue is not addressed by any statutory
rules. Nevertheless, it has been argued that treasury shares should be preemp-
tively offered to all shareholders136 and that such a preemption right can be
131 Enrico Ginevra, “La determinazione del prezzo e del sovrapprezzo negli aumenti di
capitale sociale a pagamento”, Rivista delle Società 1998, 498, 519.
132 Piergaetano Marchetti, Gli aumenti di capitale, in: Serenella Rossi (ed.), Il nuovo ordi-
namento delle società, 2003, p. 274 (shares can be offered either through a public offer
or to selected investors); Gaia Balp/Marco Ventoruzzo, “Esclusione del diritto di op-
zione nelle società con azioni quotate nei limiti del dieci per cento e determinazione del
prezzo di emissione”, Rivista delle Società 2004, 811 (same solution); Amal Abu Aw-
wad, Il diritto d’opzione nelle società quotata, 2013, p. 126 (shares can only be offered
to selected investors).
133 See, with different general positions:D’Attorre (fn. 116), p. 321 (when the exclusion of
preemptive right is justified it does not necessarily respect shareholders’ equality) and
Abu Awwad (fn. 132), p. 190 (shareholders’ equal treatment is pursued through market
mechanisms).
134 CONSOB Regulation 17221/2010.
135 Directors can only sell these shares if they have been previously authorized by the
general meeting of shareholders: Article 2357-bis Italian Civil Code.
136 Nicola De Luca, La società azionista, 2012, p. 69–71 (who differentiates a right to keep
shareholders’ position from shareholders’ equal treatment).
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waived following the rules and conditions on the issue of new shares.137 This
issue, however, is still controversial and no decision on its merit has been pub-
lished so far.
Finally, it is worth mentioning that large shareholders routinely use acceler-
ated bookbuilding mechanisms in order to sell their shares.138 In this case, the
main issue is whether a shareholder, who aims at selling its stake in a company,
can legitimately possess inside information to be disclosed to potential buyers
in order to gauge their interests in that deal, and whether companies should
transfer inside information to shareholders who aim at selling their shares.
As a general rule, shareholders can only receive information on their compa-
nies’ affairs in circumstances indicated in specific statutory rules139 and direc-
tors must not disclose business information, unless such disclosure is statuto-
rily allowed for specific purposes. In particular, information can circulate be-
tween a controlled entity and its controlling shareholder or among controlled
companies.140 Such rules related to groups of companies have led to debate:
while certain scholars have argued that the general duty of confidentiality
does not apply within groups of companies141, other scholars maintain that
subsidiaries do not face any duties to provide information to the holding com-
137 De Luca (fn. 136), p. 72. For a different opinion, see D’Attorre (fn. 116), p. 368.
138 Italian legal scholars, however, do not seem to have addressed this topic; this point is
made by Paolo Giudici, Le offerte degli emittenti: determinazione dei prezzi e altre
clausole contrattuali. I contratti con i gatekeepers, in: Vincenzo Roppo/Alberto
M. Benedetti (ed.), Trattato dei contratti, 2014, p. 991, 1071.
139 Shareholders can ask to view the shareholders’ book, minutes of shareholders’ general
meetings (Italian Civil Code, Article 2422) and the annual accounts filed with the com-
pany’s statutory seat (Italian Civil Code Article 2435 c.c.). Additionally, shareholders
of listed companies can also inspect any documents filed with the company’s seat re-
garding general meetings that have been already called: Unified Act on Finance Arti-
cle 130. See, Dario Latella, Informazione societaria e tutela delle minoranze nelle soci-
età quotate, in: Mario Campobasso/Vincenzo Cariello/Vincenzo Di Cataldo/Fabrizio
Guerrera/Antonella Sciarrone Alibrandi (ed.), Società, banche e crisi d’impresa – Liber
Amicorum PAbbadessa, 2014, vol. 1, p. 775 (who suggests a broad interpretation of
this rule that is to be applied to other cases by analogy).
140 Italian Civil Code Article 2381(5): executive directors should inform the board on
most relevant transactions decided by controlled companies; Italian Civil Code Arti-
cle 2403bis(2): the auditing board can ask the board of directors to disclose information
related to controlled entities; Italian Civil Code Article 2497: liability of the controlling
entity for damages suffered by controlled companies; Unified Act on Finance Arti-
cle 151(1): the supervisory board of listed companies can require information directly
to supervisory boards of controlled companies.
141 Giovanni E. Colombo, Amministrazione e controllo, in: Serenella Rossi (ed.), Il nuovo
ordinamento delle società, 2004, p. 182; Giorgio M. Zamperetti, Il dovere di informa-
zione degli amministratorri nella governance delle società per azioni, 2005, 221; Paolo
Montalenti, “L’informazione nei gruppi societari”, Società per azioni, corporate gov-
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pany.142 However, due to the concentration of share ownership of Italian listed
companies, exchanges of information continuously occur between block-
holders and directors.143 These circumstances were originally reflected in the
Italian regime, according to which “controlling entities” had also to comply
with the duty to disclose inside information144 and insider dealing could also
be committed by persons “having a holding in the capital of the issuer” when
they possess inside information.145 This provision was likely to be at odds with
general company law principles146 and was eventually repealed in 2012.147 Ad-
ditionally, such a disclosure of information to selected shareholders risks vio-
lating the general principle of equality, which, as we have seen above, is still
paramount for Italian listed companies. And yet, any shareholders who aim at
selling their shares need to disclose pieces of inside information, to sound out
potential investors and to allow potential buyers to assess the value of the
shares (“due diligence”). Whether companies face a duty to facilitate share-
holders who aim at selling their shares, is a further question shrouded in un-
certainty, which legal scholars, with the clear aim to facilitate such transac-
tions, seem to accept, despite the general duty of confidentiality and the prin-
ciple of shareholders’ equal treatment.148 As a general principle, however, any
situation in which a block trader, such as a majority shareholder, discloses in-
formation to the buyer, in order to finalize a deal and sell its shares, is not to be
classified as a market sounding activity.149
ernance e mercati finanziari, 2011, 265–266 (board members of a controlled entity
should provide information to the controlling entity if requested).
142 See Vittorio Giorgi, Libertà di informazione e dovere di riservatezza degli amministra-
tori nei gruppi di società, 2005, p. 256;Nicola Rondinone, “Società (gruppi di)”, Diges-
to delle discipline privatistiche (sezione commerciale), aggiornamento no. 5, 2009, 634
(members of the supervisory board of a controlled company do not face a general duty
of providing information to the controlling entity).
143 Berardino Libonati, “Il ruolo dell’assemblea nel rapporto tra azionisti e società quo-
tate”, Rivista delle Società 2001, 105.
144 Unified Act on Finance, Article 114.1.
145 Unified Act on Finance, Article 184.
146 See Giannelli/Mosca (fn. 122), p. 16–18.
147 Legislative decree 184/2012, Article 1.10.a.
148 See: Luca Picone, “Trattative, due diligence e obblighi informativi delle società quo-
tate”, Banca borsa titoli di credito 2007, I/236, 256–257;Umberto Tombari, “Problemi
in tema di alienazione della partecipazione azionaria e attività di due diligence”, Banca
borsa titoli di credito 2008, I/65.
149 ESMA Final Report, Draft technical standards on the Market Abuse Regulation,
28 September 2015, p. 22 para 70.
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3.2. The United Kingdom
a. The Market Abuse Regime
U.K. insider dealing prohibition is also based upon a dual system. First, insider
dealing is a criminal offence entailed in the Criminal Justice Act 1993, which
requires a subjective element, or mens rea, for being punished.150 Secondly, in-
sider dealing is also punished through an administrative offence,151 which,
technically speaking, does not require mens rea. This second prong of the
U.K. regime, however, has been recently amended through the Financial Ser-
vices and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016.152 The 2016
regulation, in particular, repealed sections 118 to 122(a) from the Financial Ser-
vices Market Act.153 The reason is, of course, that insider dealing is now en-
tailed in a EU regulation having direct effect in the U.K. as a Member State of
the EU, with the consequence that the former sections 118–122 of the Finan-
cial Services Market Act have become redundant. The logic of the reform is
that the entire regulation of insider dealing, including the market sounding re-
gime, is now governed by the directly applicable MAR, so that any market
soundings will be exclusively assessed in light of the provisions of Article 11
of this Regulation.
Market soundings have also attracted much attention in the U.K. financial mar-
ket.154 In this respect, since 2005 the FSA/FCA handbook has specified which
factors should be taken into account to assess whether a disclosure is made “in
the proper course of the exercise of [an] employment, profession or duties”.155
In particular, any disclosures should be “accompanied by the imposition of
150 Criminal Justice Act 1993, s. 52–64.
151 Financial Services Market Act, s. 123. On the development of British rules on insider
dealing, and the need to implement the first directive on this matter, see, Paul L. Da-
vies, “The European Community’s Directive on Insider Dealing: From Company Law
to Securities Market Regulation?”, Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 1991, 92.
152 The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016, Statu-
tory Instrument 680/2016, s. 9. Ironically, this piece of legislation was approved on
June 29, 2016 and entered into force on July 3, a few days after the “Brexit” referen-
dum.
153 Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (Market Abuse) Regulations 2016, s. 9(3).
154 It is interesting to note that, in the U.K. market, IPOs are normally implemented
through “bookbuilding” proceedings, which have replaced the more traditional pro-
cess based on the role of an underwriter. Eilís Ferran/Look C. Ho, Principles of Cor-
porate Finance Law, 2014, p. 372.
155 FCA Handbook MAR 1.4.5. These provisions are based upon Financial Services Mar-
ket Act s. 118(3) which specifies that disclosures are unlawful unless made “in the
proper course of the exercise of [an] employment, profession or duties.”
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confidentiality requirements”, should be “reasonable” and, among other fac-
tors, should aim at facilitating a “commercial, financial or investment transac-
tion”.156 Additionally, the questions arise as to whether an investor can refuse
to be wall-crossed and in which circumstances an investor refusing to be wall-
crossed can rely on the issuer’s commitment to discuss a future transaction
without transferring inside information.
The FSA (now FCA)157 addressed market soundings in a final notice rendered
in 2012 upon request of David Einhorn.158 David Einhorn was a portfolio
manager (and sole shareholder) of a US based investment company (Green-
light Capital Inc), which held about 13% of share capital of the British com-
pany Punch Tavern plc. Punch planned to raise its capital and issue new shares,
and to this aim it entered into discussion with selected potential investors, in
order to gauge their interest in subscribing those newly issued shares. While
other investors accepted the receipt of inside information and signed specific
non-disclosure agreements, Mr Einhorn explicitly refused to be “wall-
crossed” in any conversations related to possible transactions or operations
envisaged by Punch. Mr Einhorn only agreed to have a telephone conference
call with a broker, acting on behalf of Punch, under the assumption that it
should be on a “non-wall-crossed basis”. Nevertheless, during this conversa-
tion the broker referred to a possible issue of new shares by Punch, aimed at
repaying convertible bonds. Following this call, Mr Einhorn decided to sell
part of Greenlight’s shareholding in Punch (which was hence reduced from
13.3% to 8.98%). After the announcement of the raising of new capital, the
share price fell by almost 30%; consequently, by selling part of its investment
in Punch, Mr Einhorn avoided a loss that would have been much more signifi-
cant had he retained all shares. Mr Einhorn explicitly asked not to be wall-
crossed and not to receive inside information, and indeed the conversation
with the broker was set on quite general and hypothetical terms. In this regard,
it is worth remembering that Greenlight mainly invested in mispriced shares,
and, after his conversation with the broker, Mr Einhorn understood that
Punch’s profile may not have fitted Greenlight’s strategies. Eventually, Mr Ein-
horn also replied that he only sold 4% of Punch’s shares, showing that he was
not sure that Punch was really about to issue new equity shares. The FSA re-
jected Mr Einhorn’s arguments and, as a consequence, imposed on him and
Greenlight a penalty for violation of insider dealing. The FSA, in particular,
hold that, givenMr Einhorn’s experience, “it should have been apparent to him
156 See FCA Handbook MAR 1.4.5.
157 In 2013 the Financial Conduct Authority (FCA), acting as U.K. Listing Authority as
delegated by the Financial Services Market Act, replaced the former Financial Service
Authority (FSA).
158 FSA, Decision Notice 12 January 2012.
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that the information he received [...] was confidential and price sensitive” and,
therefore, that it was a “serious error” not having sought for legal advice in this
regard before selling Punch’s shares, despite its explicit request of not being
wall-crossed.159
Therefore, it is made clear that any investors which enter into conversations
with a company on future possible transactions, such as the issue of new
shares, should autonomously assess whether the information received falls
within the definition of “inside information”, regardless of a formal statement
that such conversations were held on a “non-wall-crossed basis”. This rigid
interpretation of subjective factors aims at deterring insider dealings concealed
behind the veil of “non-wall-crossed” conversations. This decision is clearly
one of the motives behind the decision to explicitly regulate market soundings
in the new Market Abuse Regulation, which clarifies that the recipient of in-
formation in a market sounding proceeding should autonomously assess
whether inside information was communicated or not, regardless of their re-
quest to not be wall-crossed.160
b. Directors’ Duties and the Principle of Equal Treatment of Shareholders
The same questions that we have analyzed with regard to the Italian regime
obviously arise in a sophisticated financial market such as the British one. First
of all, during securities’ issuances, the question arises as to whether selective
disclosures violate directors’ fiduciary duties. In this respect, it is worth re-
membering that English law is reluctant to accept the idea that directors owe
fiduciary duties to individual shareholders,161 unless special relations between
directors and shareholders exist that give rise to fiduciary duties to individual
shareholders.162 As a general principle, indeed, directors should act in good
159 In this regard, it is necessary to remember that under the original version of s. 123
FSMA, the FSA could decide not to impose penalties if there were “reasonable grounds
for it to be satisfied that” the person whose actions are discusses either “believed, on
reasonable grounds, that his behaviour did not fall within” the definitions of insider
dealing or “took all reasonable precautions and exercised all due diligence to avoid
behaving in a way which fell within” the definition of insider dealing. Financial Ser-
vices Market Act, s. A123 (2). See Gullifer/Payne (fn. 52), p. 607. The new version of
s. 123 FSMA, however, does not mention that the author should have “believed, on
reasonable grounds” that his behavior was not insider dealing.
160 Article 11.7. MAR.
161 Percival v Wright, 23 June 1902, [1902] 2 Ch 421 (Chancery Division).
162 Peskin v Anderson, 14 December 2000, [2001] 1 BCLC 372 (Court of Appeal); Sharp v
Blank [2015] EWHC 3220 (Chancery division). See Paul Davies/Sarah Worthington,
Gower & Davies Principles of Modern Company Law, 10th ed., 2016, p. 467–469.
342 Stefano Lombardo and Federico M. Mucciarelli ECFR 3/2019
Brought to you by | School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London
Authenticated
Download Date | 8/7/19 9:56 AM
faith “to promote the interest of the company as a whole”,163 meaning present
and future shareholders collectively.164 This principle, however, does not
clearly answer the question as to whether (and if yes, to what extent) a general
duty of shareholders’ equal treatment exists.
Under English company law, as a general rule of construction, the relations be-
tween shareholders and their company are governed by a presumption of equal-
ity, unless the articles of association provide for explicit preferential treatments
of certain classes of shares.165 Additionally, a possible hurdle in theway of share-
holder discriminationsmay be erected by the proper purpose doctrine,166 which
requires assessing in an objectivemannerwhether a certain transaction – such as
issuing new shares –was underpinned by an “improper purpose” and whether
suchpurposewas the substantial purpose envisagedbydirectors.167 In thewords
of Wilberforce J in the decision Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd,
directors “are of course entitled to offer advice, and bound to supply informa-
tion, relevant to themakingof such adecision [launching anoffer for shares], but
to use their fiduciary power solely for the purpose of shifting the power to de-
cide to whom and at what price shares are to be sold cannot be related to any
purpose forwhich thepowerover the share capitalwas conferredupon them.”168
In several decisions, directors were deemed to be acting for improper purposes
when they issued new shares to selected investors or shareholders with the aim
of altering the shareholder composition, defeating a takeover attempt, and ulti-
mately fostering their control.169 Furthermore, a principle of equal treatment
163 Companies Act 2006 s. 172(1).
164 Andrew Keay, Direcors’ Duties, 2014, p. 141; Davies/Worthington (fn. 162), p. 465–
466.
165 Birch v Cropper, 9 August 1889, [1889] 14 App Cas 525 (House of Lords) (equal dis-
tribution of assets during a company’s winding up).
166 Companies Act 2006, s. 171 (b): directors must “only exercise powers for the purposes
for which they are conferred”.
167 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, 14 February 1974, [1974] Ac 821 (Privy
Council).
168 Howard Smith Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, 14 February 1974, [1974] Ac 821 (fn. 167),
838 (PC).
169 See: Punt v Symons & Co Ltd, 17 June 1903, [1903] 2 Ch 506 (Chancery Division);
Piercy v S. Mills & Co., 22 July 1919, [1920] 1 Ch 77 (Chancery Division); Hogg v
Cramphorn Ltd 18 October 1967, [1967] Ch 254 (Chancery Division);Howard Smith
Ltd v Ampol Petroleum Ltd, 14 February 1974 [1974] AC 821 (Privy Council); Extra-
sure Travel Insurances v Scattergood, 22 July 2002, [2003] 1 BCLC 598 (Chancery Di-
vision). See also Madoff Securities International Ltd (in liquidation) v Raven et al.,
18 October 2013, [2013] EWHC 3147 (Queen’s Bench Division Commercial Court),
at 199, where Popplewell J held, albeit only obiter dictum, that the proper purpose
doctrine triggers a fault-based test, not an objective test.
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of all shareholders who are in the same position is entailed in the second com-
pany law directive, with regard to capital increase or decrease and share re-
purchases,170 and in the transparency directive, with regard to information to
shareholders.171 These principles partially reflect previous common law rules,
which maintain that, in a capital reduction and in a company’s liquidation, as-
sets should be repaid and losses are to be shared by respecting the ranking
order of each class of shares.172
Nevertheless, English company law does not entail a general and overarching
duty of equal treatment of shareholders, just a principle of fair treatment. This
issue was clearly addressed in the case Mutual Life Insurance Co v The Rank
Organization Ltd.173 Rank Organization was a British company that decided
to issue new shares, by granting a pre-emptive right to existing shareholders.
Directors of the issuing company, however, decided to exclude from the offer
all shareholders who were resident in the US and Canada, in order to avoid the
application of US and Canadian securities law, including a duty to register in
those jurisdictions and to comply with their securities regulation. US and Ca-
nadian securities regulation, indeed, normally applies “extraterritorially” to
any transactions addressed to a certain number of US or Canadian residents.174
The plaintiff challenged such a decision for being “oppressive”175 due to its
discriminatory nature. In rejecting this claim, Gourdin J stressed that Rank’s
directors acted in good faith in the interests of the company as a whole, since
the risk of facing a duty to comply with foreign law in that specific case was a
sufficient justification for such differential treatment.176
170 Directive 77/91/EEC of 13 December 1976, Article 46. In the event of a share repurch-
ase, the Companies Act protects shareholders by considering market repurchase as the
normal method of share repurchase, which implies a general preference for equal treat-
ment among shareholders.
171 Directive 2013/50/EU of 6 November 2011, OJ 6.11.2013 L294/13, recasting Directive
2004/109/EC, Article 17. This principle is implemented by the FCA Disclosure and
Transparency Rules, 6.1.3.
172 Birch v Cropper, 9 August 1889, [1889] 14 App Cas 525 (House of Lords); Re Chatter-
ley Whitfield Collieries Ltd, 30 July 1948, [1948] 2 All ER 593 (Court of Appeal).
173 Mutual Life Insurance Co v The Rank Organization Ltd, 21 December 1981, [1985]
BCLC 11 (Chancery Division).
174 See, Stephen J. Choi/Andrew T. Guzman, “Internalization of securities: the dangerous
extraterritoriality of American securities law”, Northwestern Journal of International
Law & Business 1996, 207; Milosz Morgut, “Extraterritorial Application of US Secu-
rities Law”, European Business Law Review 2012, 548.
175 Companies Act 1948, s. 210. The action for “oppression” was the predecessor of the
unfair prejudice action introduced in the Companies Act 1985, s. 459 (now: Companies
Act 2006, s. 994).
176 Mutual Life Insurance Co v The Rank Organization Ltd, 21 December 1981, [1985]
BCLC 11 (fn. 173), para. 21 (CD). In doing so, Gourdin J applied the general common
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This decision clearly shows that, if directors in good faith believe that special
reasons exist in the interest of the members as a whole (meaning present and
future shareholders), an unequal or discriminatory treatment of shareholders
may be justified. Turning our attention back to market sounding activities, we
can conclude that selective disseminations of information are not per se unlaw-
ful, yet they need to be justified by objective motivations in the interest of the
company as a whole. The aim of gauging the interest of specific investors in
order to make an offer of shares possible is likely to fall within this category,
and unless directors’ substantial purpose was not to alter the shareholder com-
position and foster their power.
c. Shareholders’ Preemptive Right
A further obstacle in the way of share issuances is posed by shareholders’ pre-
emptive right, aimed at protecting current shareholders against wealth trans-
fers and a dilution of their position in the company. According to the Compa-
nies Act 2006, new “equity securities”must be offered to existing shareholders
in proportion to the nominal value of capital held by each shareholder.177 The
Articles or a special resolution, however, can disapply pre-emptive right, pro-
vided that such disapplication is duly authorised by the general meeting of
shareholders. Such authorisations are to be recommended by directors, who
should issue a written statement on the reason for excluding the pre-emptive
right and on the justification of the price of newly issued shares.178 A disappli-
cation of pre-emptive right, therefore, does not need to be justified by special
reasons in the interest of the company, provided that the specific procedure set
forth in the Companies Act has been respected and directors have acted in
law rule that directors’ fiduciary power should be exercised bona fide in the interest of
the company: see Lord Greene inRe Smith and Fawcett Ltd, 27 March 1942, [1942] Ch
304, at 306. The reason given by Gourdin J was followed by Arden J in Re BSB Hold-
ings Ltd (No 2), 28 July 1995, [1996] 1 BCLC 155 (Chancery Division). Before this line
of cases, see also Gaiman v the National Association for Mental Health, 25 March
1970, [1970] 2 All ER 362 (Chancery Division): the Articles of a company limited by
guarantee gave directors the power to request shareholders to resign; directors used
this power against a shareholder, who challenged – unsuccessfully – this decision for
breach of directors’ fiduciary duties; Megarry J argued that “principles of natural jus-
tice” could apply to a company formed under the Companies Acts.
177 S. 561 (1)(a) Companies Act 2006. Equity securities are (a) ordinary shares in the com-
pany (shares other than shares that as respects dividends and capital carry a right to
participate only up to a specified amount in a distribution) and (b) rights to subscribe
for, or to convert securities into, ordinary shares in the company (S. 560 Companies
Act 2006).
178 Companies Act 2006, s. 568.
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conformity to their duties. Regarding issues of shares to the public, one of the
most controversial questions is to what extent new shares can be issued at a
discount to facilitate the success of their allotment. As a general fiduciary duty,
directors should promote the success of the company in the interests of the
members as a whole and, therefore, in principle they should obtain the best
price available for newly issued shares.179 Nevertheless, allotments at discount
are a normal practice to facilitate share issuances.180
d. Sale of Treasury Shares
Finally, we should address sales of treasury shares, which are often conducted
by way of accelerated bookbuilding. In this respect, the Companies Act 2006
grants current shareholders a pre-emption right with regard to shares held in
treasury by the issuing company,181 unless such right is waived according to the
provisions set forth in the Companies Act. In this respect, it is worth mention-
ing that a common strategy for avoiding pre-emptive right for modest share
issuances or sales is the “vendor placing”, whereby the issuing company allots
shares to a third party (the “vendor”) in exchange for an asset, while the vendor
immediately sells these shares to the market for cash. In these cases, only a
moderate discount from the market price is acceptable.182
179 Lowry v Consolidated African Selection Trust Ltd, 8 May 1940, [1940] AC 648 (House
of Lords).
180 Shearer v Bercain, 7 March 1980, [1980] 3 All. E.R. 295 (Chancery Division); Re Sun-
rise Radio Ltd, 13 November 2009, [2009] EWHC 2893 (Chancery Division). Accord-
ing to FCA listing rules, listed companies must not offer new shares at a discount of
more than 10% of the “middle market price of those shares”: FCA Handbook LR
9.5.10. Additionally, we should mention that secondary offers are normally made at a
discount between 30% and 40% to the TERP (such discount was between 15% and
20% in the 1980s): Association of British Insurers, Encouraging Equity Investment:
Facilitation of Efficient Equity Capital Raising in the UK Market, July 2013, 32.
181 S. 560(3) Companies Act 2006. See Ferran/Ho (fn. 154), p. 125; Davies/Worthington
(fn. 162), p. 318.
182 Pre-Emption group, “Disapplying preemption right”, 2015, stating that a discount of
5% is considered acceptable, beyond which limits shareholders should be granted a
claw back right. The Pre-Emption Group is a private entity, representing listed com-
panies, investors and intermediaries, with the aim of issuing guidelines for the exercise
or disapplication of the preemption right: http://www.pre-emptiongroup.org.uk/Abo
ut-Us.aspx, last visited: 5 February 2019.
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4. Conclusions
This article has addressed the interaction between market sounding provisions
of Article 11 MAR and national company law rules and principles. To this aim,
we have analysed such interaction in Italy and the U.K.: while the former is a
typical example of bank-led system where most companies, including listed
companies, are closely-held, the latter is one of the models of market-led sys-
tems, where the capital market is highly developed and sophisticated. The ma-
jor point of this article is to investigate the intersection between uniform rules
on market sounding and national company law rules and principles, such as
director fiduciary duties and principles of shareholders’ fair or equal treatment.
In particular, the following situations, in which companies or shareholders
may sound out the market, have been analyzed: (a) secondary offerings; (b)
accelerated bookbuilding when the company acts as offeror; (c) accelerated
bookbuilding when a shareholder acts as offeror.
In the latter situation, namely when a selling shareholder sounds out the mar-
ket, no national company law rules and principles exist in the U.K. and in Italy
that may contradict the uniform rules of the regulation. By contrast, this article
has shown that, when market sounding is undertaken before either secondary
offerings or selling of treasury shares, the question arises as to whether domes-
tic director duties and principles of shareholders’ fair or equal treatment might
be at odds with a uniform application of market sounding rules.
This article has shown that the Italian and British regimes move from partially
different starting points. In Italy, the statutory principle of shareholder equal
treatment is drafted in a rigid fashion, so that it might be an obstacle in the
way of market soundings. In particular, listed companies should follow a
strict principle of shareholders’ equal treatment, which conflicts with the prac-
tice of disseminating information to selected shareholders in order to gauge
their opinion on the envisaged transactions. In this regard, it is to be noted
that scholars increasingly agree that the principle of equal treatment should be
relaxed in order to allow selective disclosure, but this issue is still controversial
and it is uncertain how the Italian regime will develop in the years to come.
English company law rules and principles, by contrast, are generally more
flexible and can be adapted to financial market needs, including issuers’ aim
to gauge the opinion of selected investors on an envisaged transaction. Never-
theless, companies’ agents should carefully consider domestic fiduciary duties
even though they fully comply with market sounding procedures regulated
through the MAR and the FCA provisions. One of the possible explanations
of such differences might be the diverging ownership structures of these
countries. It is well-known, in particular, that families still control most
Italian listed companies, while U.K. companies are predominantly widely-
held.
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The main tenet of this article is that company law and securities law might
follow diverging principles and might contradict each other. This is also true
with regard to provisions entailed in directly applicable regulations. The rea-
son is that company law regimes, despite the intense harmonising effort of EU
institutions, are still in member states’ competence. Therefore, even though
companies’ agents comply with market sounding procedures, it is to be
checked whether domestic fiduciary duties are respected. Additionally, it is
unlikely that the lex specialis position of national company regimes will change
in the future. Company law regimes, which are enacted by national parlia-
ments and courts, respond to domestic communities and constituencies and
hence reveal significant conceptual differences across jurisdictions.183 Com-
pany law, in other words, seems to be partially embedded in local societies and
in their power structures,184 despite the increasing harmonisation effort at the
EU level. Financial markets, by contrast, are increasingly governed by uniform
rules decided at a supranational level, such as the MAR; these uniform rules do
not respond to national communities and constituencies, but to a broader
cross-border “cosmopolitan” community of business people and investors.
Rules on market soundings are a typical example of this contradiction: on the
one hand, a selective dissemination of information might violate basic princi-
ples of equality or director duties rooted in national company law regimes; on
the other hand, such disseminations are often necessary to gauge the opinion of
potential investors and to make a share issuance possible. Despite an unavoid-
able tension between uniform financial rules and national company regimes,
the increasing relevance of financial markets is likely to trigger a spontaneous
“bottom-up” convergence of different models towards rules facilitating mar-
ket transactions. Nevertheless, given the differences of ownership structures
and social actors across European countries, inconsistencies between company
law financial rules might always emerge, and it is to be hoped that national
policy makers and courts become increasingly aware of such hidden discrepan-
cies and fragmentation in order to rationally deal with them.
183 See for instance Nicholas Foster, “Company Law Theory in Comparative Perspective:
England and France”, American Journal of Comparative Law 2000, 573.
184 On the distinction between legal institutions “organic” to a society and its power struc-
ture and legal institutions that are merely “mechanical” or “technical”, seeOtto Kahn-
Freund, “On Uses and Misuses of Comparative Law”, Modern Law Review 1974, 1.
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